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1 1. INTRODUCTION 
A  reliable  assessment  of a  company's  failure  probability  is  useful  to  a  large  number  of 
economic agents, including potential investors, lenders, clients, suppliers, etc.  This explains 
the constant attention paid to bankruptcy prediction modeling in the finance and accounting 
literature  ever  since  the  pioneering  work  by  Beaver  (1966).  Because  of the  growing 
availability of data and the development of improved econometrical techniques, the number 
of  bankruptcy prediction models has increased exponentially, especially during the 1980s and 
1990s. Most of  this work has been strongly influenced by a small number of early papers (e.g. 
Altman,  1968;  Ohlson,  1980;  Zavgren,  1985)  on  U.S.  quoted  companies.  Consequently, 
prediction  models  typically  include  accounting  proxies  for  liquidity,  leverage,  past  and 
current performance, efficiency and size of individual sample firms.  This type of modeling 
implicitly introduces the assumption that sample companies are stand-alone firms.  However, 
over  the  last  decade,  research  on  ownership  and  control  has  documented  that  in  many 
countries,  business  groups play  an  important role.  In  an  international  study  on  ownership 
structure of quoted companies, La Porta et al.  (1999) conclude that dispersed ownership is 
only generally present in the U.S., the U.K. and some of the smaller Anglo-Saxon countries. 
Elsewhere, they find that firms are often part of  a business group controlled by large corporate 
owners. These findings  have been confirmed by many studies (for a survey, see Denis and 
McConnell, 2003). Moreover, it has been shown that in such groups resources and risk are 
reallocated across  firms  through  internal  capital  markets  (e.g.  Shin and  Stultz,  1998).  For 
bankruptcy prediction models this raises the question whether using only variables defined on 
individual firm level is appropriate. 
A few bankruptcy prediction studies have attempted to account for intra-group effects. 
One rudimentary way to control for group related factors is the inclusion of  a dummy variable 
representing  group  membership.  Using  this  approach,  Heiss  and  Koke  (2004)  empirically 
2 examine the impact of control structure on ownership changes and failure in Germany. Their 
evidence only weakly supports the notion that pyramidal ownership and failure  are  linked. 
However, as the authors point out, this may be the result of  lack of  power, due to the very low 
number  of failing  firms  in  their  sample.  Bechetti  and  Sierra  (2003)  include  a  group 
membership  dummy  ill  a  prediction  model  estimated  on  a  large  sample  of  Italian 
manufacturing  firms,  and  find  a  negative  relationship  between probability  of failure  and 
business group membership between 1992 and 1997. Ooghe et aI. (1991) incorporate a "group 
relationships" ratio.  This ratio is  defined as  the  portion of assets committed by the  sample 
firm  to  other  group  member  companies  and  proves  to  be  negatively  related  to  survival 
chances. 
Using a sample of mostly non-quoted Belgian medium and large sized firms and their 
controlling shareholders, we show that combining company and group level data increases fit 
and classification performance of prediction models to  a much larger extent than the group 
adjustment attempts made thus far in the literature. The data also indicate that private business 
groups support struggling subsidiaries. Especially when these groups are  financially  sound, 
bankruptcy of a distressed subsidiary becomes unlikely. We also show that the determinants 
of bankruptcy  differ  between  stand-alone  companies  and  subsidiaries,  so  that  estimating 
separate models for both types of  companies significantly increases predictive performance. 
The  sample has several interesting features.  First, as  in other Continental European 
countries, private business groups playa crucial role in the Belgian economy.! Contrary to the 
case of U.S. conglomerates (e.g. Gertner et aI.,  1994), member firms ofa business group may 
- in addition to  using the internal capital market - also directly access the external market. 
I  Of the 27  industrialized countries examined in  La  Porta et al.  (1999),  Belgium has  the highest presence of 
pyramids  and  controlling  shareholders.  Becht  et  al.  (1999)  conclude  that  due  to  corporate  ownership  via 
pyramids, cross participations, and voting blocks held by holding firms and families, Belgium is a prototype of 
an  'insider  system'.  Simultaneously,  external  capital  markets  are  relatively  underdeveloped,  increasing  the 
importance of internal resources. Equity market capitalization at the end of September 2002 was 49.1 % of GDP 
for Belgium, compared to  98.5% for the United States and a European Union average of 65.7%.  The value of 
outstanding corporate debt securities equaled 9.8% ofGDP (US: 22.9%, EU: 9.5%). 
3 Hence, next to the group perspective, also the individual firm's financing decisions remain 
important. Therefore, the behavior of business groups towards distressed subsidiaries and the 
way this affects the likelihood of subsidiary bankruptcy, is a matter of direct concern for all 
providers of external capital. This of course adds a dimension to the problem of bankruptcy 
prediction. Furthermore, almost all sample companies (i.e.  98.7% of all included firms)  are 
privately  held,  while  the  vast  majority  of internal  capital  market,  business  group  and 
bankruptcy prediction studies  are  limited to  quoted  firms  - often  due  to  data availability 
problems. Consequently, access to  equity capital should be relatively more difficult for the 
companies in our sample, so that for each subsidiary the use of the internal capital market is 
likely  to  be  an  important  part  of its  financial  management.  Deloof (1998)  empirically 
confirms this for large non-quoted Belgian companies. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as  follows:  section 2 describes the potential 
impact  of the  presence  of a  group  on the  informational  content  of important  bankruptcy 
prediction variables, section 3 describes the sample, section 4 contains some methodological 
issues, section 5 reports the test results and section 6 concludes. 
2. BANKRUPTCY PREDICTION VARIABLES AND BUSINESS GROUPS 
Membership of  a business group may affect the informational content of the main bankruptcy 
prediction variables in the literature. More specifically, adding group level data may be useful 
for measures of: 
Liquidity - Using data on Japanese keiretsu and bank relationships, Hoshi et al. (1991) 
show that liquidity constraints of group member firms  are weaker than those of stand-alone 
companies. If access to  cash is  less restricted within a group, this  could lead to  a situation 
where companies belonging to a business group pay less attention to liquidity as compared to 
4 stand-alone  companies,  as  the  lattter have no  choice but to  resort to  expensive  short-term 
financing in case of liquidity shortages. Deloof (2001) empirically confirms this  for private 
Belgian companies. For a firm belonging to a business group, low liquidity need therefore not 
necessarily reflect a higher probability of  failure. 
Performance (past and current) - A business group may decide to keep a subsidiary 
afloat, even if it incurs severe losses and has been doing so for several years. This may be an 
economically  sound decision,  based on  strategic,  taxation,  control  or other  group-specific 
reasons.  Alternatively,  internal  capital  markets  may  cause  "socialism"  within  a  group  or 
conglomerate (i.e.  stronger divisions subsidize weaker ones), as  discussed in Scharfstein and 
Stein  (2000).  Empirical  evidence  of this  phenomenon  is  reported  in  Scharfstein  (1998), 
Claessens, Fan and Lang (2002) and Lamont (1997), among others. The latter shows that US 
oil  companies  subsidized  underperforming  non-oil  activities  during  the  early  1980s  when 
profits from oil operations were extremely high. After the oil shock of 1986, subsidized non-
oil  investments  were  significantly  reduced  or stopped  altogether.  Preceding  findings  and 
arguments  imply that  adding information on group  level performance could be useful  for 
bankruptcy  prediction  purposes.  Specifically,  strong  group  performance  should  positively 
affect survival chances of subsidiaries. 
Leverage - High firm leverage may be less important for the survival chances of group 
member companies as compared to those of stand-alone firms.  Hoshi et al.  (1990) argue that 
the  costs  arising  from  information  asymmetries  at  debt  renegotiations  are  smaller within 
business groups. These decreased potential costs of financial distress allow group members to 
ex ante take on more debt,  thus realizing more tax gains and avoiding relatively expensive 
equity  issues  (cf.  Myers  and  Majluf,  1984).  A  coinsurance  effect  across  activities  in 
diversified  groups  could further  decrease  costs  of debt,  but according to  Berger and  Ofek 
(1995), this should be of rather limited importance. Furthermore, an intra-group optimization 
5 process may take place via the internal capital market to reduce costs at all levels (cf. F  accio 
et aI., 2001; Bianco and Nicodano, 2002), again increasing ex ante optimal leverage.  Finally, 
the subsidiary may also receive intra-group debt guarantees which could increase debt bearing 
capacity even more. 
Size - Ceteris paribus, larger companies have a higher capacity to bear debt throughout 
difficult business periods and should have a lower risk of failure (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). 
Because of  the close ties between the different group members, group size may better measure 
the  size effect then the  size of the  subsidiary proper. This is  empirically confirmed by,  for 
instance, Manos and Green (2001). These authors find that the size ofIndian group affiliates 
has no impact on their capital structure, but that group size does. Belonging to a - preferably 
large - business group may also have other non-quantifiable beneficial effects:  the group's 
reputation may change perception and behavior of banks and other creditors, thus increasing 
access to external fmance in times of  need (cf. Schiantarelli and Sembenelli, 2000). 
Efficiency  - Following  Altman  (1968),  managerial  efficiency  in  the  bankruptcy 
prediction literature is often defined as sales-generating ability (proxied by a capital turnover 
ratio).  Ceteris paribus,  the  more  efficient a business group,  the better its  performance.  As 
argued above, this may have positive effects on the survival chances of  the subsidiary. 
Overall, the preceding discussion implies that (a) a failure prediction model based on 
the classic prediction variables may be less effective for group member firms as compared to 
stand-alone  companies,  and (b)  that adding group  level data may improve performance of 
bankruptcy prediction models. 
6 3. DATA AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
The  data  set  contains  externally  audited  information  on  all  non-financial  Belgian  limited 
liability corporations filing complete financial accounts for at least one year between fiscal 
years  1996  and 2001.  Because only companies that are  sufficiently large have to  file  such 
accounts, the sample consists of medium sized and large firms.2 Accounting information was 
obtained  from  the  electronic  databases  BelFirst  and  Amadeus  produced  by  data provider 
Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing. Accounts for company years not included in these 
data sets were obtained from the National Bank of Belgium. Information on ownership and 
legal  status were gathered from the  same sources.  All companies filing  for bankruptcy (cf. 
U.S.  Chapter 7  bankruptcy)  or judicial composition  (cf.  U.S.  Chapter  11  bankruptcy)  are 
termed "failing". Following common practice, separate models are estimated to predict failure 
occurring within one  and three years  after the  closing of a  fiscal  year.  As  pointed out by 
Ohlson (1980), the use of information released after a company has filed for bankruptcy may 
artificially  increase  performance of prediction models.  Therefore,  since  in  our  sample the 
typical  lag  between  the  fiscal  year  end  and  the  filing  of accounts  in  the  population  of 
companies equals 7 months3,  year t-l is  defined as  the fiscal year ended between 7 and 19 
months  prior to  failure.  Year t-3  is  defined  as  two  fiscal  years  before t-1.  For reasons  of 
comparability across  prediction lengths,  we  consider only  firms  for  which  information for 
both years t-l and t-3  is  available (cf.  Zavgren,  1985).4  Applying these criteria, we collect 
information on 156 companies that filed for bankruptcy protection between january 1  st,  2000 
2 Under Belgian Accounting Law, "large" companies are required to file complete (unconsolidated) accounts if 
they meet at  least two  of the  following  criteria:  total  assets  exceeding  3.125  million euro,  operating revenue 
exceeding 6.25 million euro, or more than 50 full time equivalent employees. Companies with on average more 
than 100 full  time  equivalent employees are always classified as  "large", regardless of assets and revenue. All 
other ("small") companies are allowed to file abbreviated accounts. 
3 Seven months is also the legally allowed maximum publication lag in Belgium. 
4  As  a robustness  check against  a potential  data  availability bias,  we  dropped this  requirement  and used  all 
available data. The main results and findings remain the same. 
7 and December 31 S\  2002. Three companies were deleted due to company specific reasons.5 
Following Ohlson (1980), the thus selected 153 failed companies are randomly paired with an 
equal number of  non-failing firms with data from the same fiscal years. 
Next, the ultimate corporate owners of the sample companies are identified. For each 
company,  a  parent  firm  that  directly  or indirectly  holds  more  than  50%  of the  shares  is 
classified as the controlling owner. Continuing the same reasoning, if  this parent firm itself is 
controlled (+50%) by another company, this third corporation ultimately controls the sample 
firm.  Working through the control chain in this way, we define the ultimate corporate owner 
(UCO) of the  sample firm  as  the  controlling company for  which there  is  no  incorporated 
majority shareholder.6  It is  assumed that this  UCO controls the business group to  which it 
belongs. Hence UCO level information is used as proxy for group characteristics. Whenever 
available, consolidated statements are used, as these should give the most realistic view of  the 
group's financial  situation.7  Occasionally, the  sample firm  is  the UCO's only  or dominant 
operational asset.  In such a case the UCO is  considered to be a shell company and sample 
firms with such a parent are reclassified as  stand-alone.8 Data on the UCO is  obtained from 
the previously mentioned sources, or from Datastream. 
5  Lemout &  Hauspie Speech Products failed in the wake of a major accounting scandal;  Sabena and Durobor 
were State controlled firms. 
6  Opting for a lower control threshold only has a marginal impact. For instance, lowering the control threshold 
from 50% to 20% increases the number of sample companies identified as business group members from  141  to 
157  in  the  one  year  before  failure  sample,  and  from  130  to  143  in  the  three  year  before  failure  sample. 
Robustness checks show that results and findings remain unaltered. 
7  Consolidated accounts  are  available  for  62.4%  (t-l) and  52.3%  (t-3)  of all  UCOs.  As  a robustness  check, 
models were rerun on the sub sample of companies for which consolidated accounts are available.  Conclusions 
remain unaffected. 
8 23  companies in the t-l sub sample and 20 companies in the t-3  sub sample are in this situation. To reclassify a 
UCO as a shell company the following decision rule is applied: the ultimate corporate owner is only one level 
above the sample firm, it has a NACE-BEL code identifying it as  a holding company, with sales less than 10% 
of total assets, total assets lower than the total assets of  its subsidiary and total assets consisting for 90% or more 
of financial assets and/or real-estate. The same rule is  applied to  classifY intermediate level owners as  ultimate 
corporate owner, i.e. if an intermediate corporate owner has a parent company which meets the aforementioned 
criteria, that intermediate owner is considered to be the ultimate corporate owner. This approach is conceptually 
similar to Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) who, in their research on initial public offerings in Italy, classify 
a subsidiary of a holding firm that concentrates its assets mainly in the ownership of one company as  a stand-
alone firm as opposed to a carve out or subsidiary of a business group. 
8 Table 1 contains some details of the sample composition. In panel A,  all  153  failed 
and  153  non failed  firms  are  split  into  two  sub-samples  of stand-alone  or group  member 
companies.  The  large  proportion of sample  firms  with  a  UCO  (about 45%)  confirms  the 
relative importance of business groups in the Belgian economy. Note that due to a change in 
ownership, a few companies shifted from one sub-sample to the other between t-3 and t-1. 
******************** 
Table 1 about here 
******************** 
Table 1 Panel B reports the sample's industry distribution.9 The industry distributions of the 
failed and non failed samples are rather similar. In both samples the most important industries 
are manufacturing  &  construction (43.8%)  and  distribution  (31.4%).  The  set of the  failed 
firms comprises somewhat more companies from the former industry, while the set of  the non 
failed firms includes more distribution companies. Potential industry effects are discussed in 
the next section. 
The definition of the variables as well as expected relationship with the probability of 
failure - as discussed in the previous sections - are given in Table 2.  For each of the main 
predictor variable classes, we include a ratio computed at company level and a similar ratio 
computed at UCO level.  To keep information requirements as  low as  possible we only use 
standard ratio  definitions.  We also  introduce two  dummy variables previously used in the 
literature  to  account  for  group  membership.  Finally,  we  reduce  the  impact  of extreme 
observations by winsorizing all explanatory variables at 5% and 95%. 
9 If a sample company is active in multiple industries it is categorized according to its primary activity (i.e. the 
first reported industry code). 
9 ******************** 
Table 2 about here 
******************** 
4. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
Before we tum to the results, we briefly discuss two important issues, viz. model performance 
comparison and industry adjustments. 
Performance  Comparison  - Numerous  researchers  have  attempted  to  create  R2 
equivalents for binary logistic regressions (e.g. Cox &  Snell R2, Nagelkerke R2, McFadden R2, 
etc.).  In  this  paper,  the  squared  Pearson  correlation  coefficient  (=p2)  is  used  as  an  R2 
equivalent. p2 expresses in a straightforward way how close the model's predictions are to the 
observed values and has fewer shortcomings than some of the likelihood based R2  measures 
(Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). 
We  also report the percentage of successful  classifications, both in sample and  for 
leaving-one-out approaches (quasi-jackknife). However, classification success is  only a very 
crude approximation to bankruptcy prediction - for any company it can but take the values 1 
or O.  In practice, companies are subject to  subtly different degrees of bankruptcy risk and a 
continuous variable may be more appropriate.lO 
Finally,  following  Hillegeist  et  aL  (2004),  we  statistically  compare  models  with 
respect to  informational content.  Specifically, we use an extension of the Vuong (1989) test 
that examines the significance of differences in performance of non-nested logit models. This 
test uses the log likelihood statistics of two models and checks which model is  closest to the 
"true" distribution according to the Kullback -Leibler Information Criterion. 
Industry Adjustment - Leverage, credit mix, asset mix, liquidity needs, etc, may differ 
across  industries.  Therefore,  industry  adjusted  predictor  ratios  may  improve  model 
10 In credit scoring, for instance, model output (i.e. the actual predicted value, not a 011  prediction) is translated 
into internal risk categories or transformed into bond equivalent ratings (Altman, 2002). 
10 performance. Platt and Platt (1991) divide the ratios of each sample firm by their industry 
average  and conclude this  approach leads to improved stability of the model's coefficients 
and better predictive abilities. Other authors, including Cudd and Duggal (2000), criticize the 
adjustment of fmancial ratios based only on a measure of central tendency as  this  may not 
sufficiently capture departure from the  industry norm.  Therefore, we adjust for  industry by 
subtracting the industry median ratio from the unadjusted ratio and dividing by the industry's 
ratio  inter-quartile  range  (IQR).  A  stepwise  selection  technique  determines  whether  an 
adjusted or a non-adjusted ratio is included in the model. 
5. TESTS AND RESULTS 
(i)  Univariate Tests 
Table 3 reports medians for  all  continuous predictor variables,  one  and three years before 
failure. The Table also contains median equality tests for failing and non-failing firms within 
the full sample and the sub-samples of stand-alone and group member firms. 
Consistent with the literature, median liquidity (LlQ), past and present performance 
(PP and ROA), leverage (LEV) and sales generating efficiency (EFF) are considerably worse 
for  failed firms.  The  only variable which is  not significantly different between failing  and 
non-failing firms is  size (SIZE). However, this may be explained by the fact that the sample 
contains  only  companies that have  to  publish complete  financial  accounts,  so  that  smaller 
firms  are  excluded.  By  contrast,  when group  member  firms  are  compared  to  stand-alone 
companies, the  size of the  former is  significantly larger than the  size of the  latter, both for 
failing  and non-failing companies.ll This finding  indicates that,  even within our sample of 
larger firms, ownership structure is  significantly linked to  size.  The data also  show that for 
11  Not reported in table 3. t-1: Wilcoxon T-statistic of 2.46 across failing and 2.55 across non-failing companies; 
t-3: Wilcoxon T-statistic of 2.74 across failing and 1.81  across non-failing firms. 
11 group member companies, problems may have been present for a relatively long time before 
bankruptcy. Specifically, already at t-3, efficiency (EFF) and leverage (LEV) are significantly 
worse for failing group firms as compared to failing stand-alone companies.12  Most striking 
however,  is  the  finding  that  groups  with  a  failing  subsidiary  are  in  significantly  worse 
financial health as compared to groups without failing subsidiaries. Both at t  -1  and t  -3, groups 
with a bankrupt subsidiary have worse median values for all ratios. Also, at the group level, 
size does playa role: groups with a failing subsidiary are significantly smaller than those with 
healthy subsidiaries. 
******************** 
Table 3 about here 
******************** 
Overall, the univariate tests are consistent with the bankruptcy prediction literature, as 
well as with the hypothesis that group level characteristics matter for the survival chances of 
group member companies. 
(ii) Multivariate Prediction Models and the Group Effect 
Table 4 reports optimized prediction models for t-l and t-3. The models have been estimated 
on  the  total  sample,  and  hence  comprise  both  stand-alone  firms  and  group  member 
companies. To establish a benchmark, models containing only ratios calculated at the level of 
individual sample companies are estimated (models A and B). Basically, these models ignore 
the  existence of business  groups and  internal capital markets.  Next, models A'  and B'  add 
variables as  suggested thus  far  in  the bankruptcy prediction literature to  account for  group 
phenomena. Finally, fully  extended models that allow for the inclusion of all company and 
group  level  variables  are  presented  in  A"  and  B".  Model  variables  are  selected  using  a 
12 Wilcoxon T-statistic of 1.66 for LEV and 2.06 for EFF. 
12 stepwise estimation technique that optimizes the  likelihood ratio  (i.e.  fit).  Because of their 
high correlation, the selection process was constrained to only include either leverage (LEV) 
or past performance  (PP).13  The process also  takes  into  account whether or not a variable 
should be industry adjusted (cf. section 4). Industry adjusted variables are indicated with the 
subscript  IA.  It  should  be  noted  however  that  industry  adjustment  only  increases  the 
predictive power of the sales generating efficiency measure (EFF). This is in line with Altman 
(1993), who reports that in his Z and ZETA models, the asset turnover ratio is  the variable 
most influenced by differences across industries. 
******************** 
Table 4 about here 
******************** 
Considering one year before bankruptcy prediction first,  the results in column A for 
the benchmark model without group adjustments are comparable to those of existing models 
in the literature (cf. Altman and Narayanan, 1997). As could be expected from the univariate 
results,  the  better performing and more  efficient  a  company, the  lower its  risk of failure. 
However,  again  consistent  with  the  univariate  results,  SIZE  is  not  included.  Even  this 
relatively unsophisticated model achieves a p2 of 0.548 and allows classifying 83.0% (quasi-
jackknife  corrected)  of all  sample  companies  correctly  one  year  before  the  filing  for 
bankruptcy. As indicated above, in model A' the selection procedure is also allowed to include 
variables used so far in the literature to account for the presence of a group. These variables, 
viz.  a  dummy  representing  the  presence  of a  corporate  group  (UCO)  and  a  dummy 
representing  strong  intra-group  commitments  - i.e.  loans  and  guarantees  - to  the  firm 
(NCOM),  prove to  be highly  significant  and  in line  with earlier findings  by Bechetti and 
13  The  Pearson correlation coefficient between PP  and  LEV  in  the full  sample  equals -0.69 (t-l). A similar 
restriction is put on the inclusion of  the UCO level variables GPP and GLEV. 
13 Sierra  (2003)  and  Ooghe  et  al.  (1991).  Ceteris  paribus,  group  members  and  especially 
companies  that  have  received  substantial  commitments  from  the  group,  have  a  lower 
probability of failure. By including these dummies, p2  improves from 54.8% to  56.7% while 
classification performance remains virtually unchanged. A Vuong test of relative information 
content  shows  that  model  A'  significantly  outperforms  model  A  at  the  1%  level.  The 
importance  of group  membership  and  commitments  may  be  explained  by  asymmetric 
information problems between the majority (group) shareholders and external debt providers, 
which should be relatively important in our sample of mostly non-quoted companies.  One 
could hypothesise that the limited liability of each member of a group offers more scope for 
the  controlling  corporate  shareholders  to  extract  benefits  at  the  expense  of external  debt 
holders,  i.e.  'milk'  a  subsidiary  and  then  shed  it  through  banluuptcy  (cf.  Bianco  and 
Nicodano, 2002). Rational external debt providers anticipate this  and will demand security 
and commitments from  other companies within the group,  thereby intensifying intra-group 
ties.  This is  consistent with evidence from,  for instance, Chang and Hong (2000) who show 
that debt guarantees are a widely used cross-subsidization technique between Korean chaebol 
members.  Allowing  a  subsidiary  to  fail  may  then  have  a  severe  negative  impact  on  the 
relationships  between  the  parent  and  its  lenders  as  well  as  on the  group's  reputation  in 
general, and result in an increased cost of capital (Bebchuk et aI., 2000). 
An even more substantial increase in fit and classification performance is obtained in 
model A", where the set of selectable variables is further extended to include prediction ratios 
defined at group or ultimate owner level.  p2  increases to  65.9% and prediction accuracy to 
87.3% (quasi-jackknife corrected). Consistent with our expectations, firms belonging to more 
liquid (GLIQ), less levered (GLEV) and more profitable groups (GROA), have better chances 
for survival. In line with the univariate tests, size only plays a role at the group level (GSIZE) 
as  subsidiaries of larger groups or UCOs are  less  likely to  fail.  Furthermore, the  UCO and 
14 NCOM dummies are no longer included in the optimized specification, which indicates that 
their explanatory content is  subsumed by the  group  level  ratios.  Vuong tests  confirm that 
model A" strongly outperforms both the unadjusted benchmark model A and the "first pass" 
adjusted model A'  . 
It goes without saying that both fit and classification accuracy decline as the prediction 
period lengthens. Three years before failure, the benchmark model B only has a p2 of 20.1 % 
and classifies 69.0% (quasi-jackknife corrected) of all observations correctly. Relative to the 
one year ahead prediction model, adding the dummies UCO and NCOM (model B'),  brings 
about a more marked improvement both in terms of p2  (increases from 20.1 % to 25.7%) and 
in terms of  classification performance (increases from 69% to 72.9%).  Especially the NCOM 
dummy is highly significant. These results indicate that, ceteris paribus, belonging to a group 
also  has  an  important  positive  impact  on  medium  term  survival  chances.  However,  the 
increase in performance from including more detailed group information is not as strong as in 
the case of one year ahead prediction (cf.  Vuong tests). As compared to model B', the p2  of 
model B" only increases from 25.7% to 27.4% while quasi-jackknife corrected classification 
performance slightly  drops  from  72.9% to  71.6%.  Nevertheless,  although  only  group  size 
(OSIZE) and group leverage (OLEV) have a significant impact, these group level variables 
still subsume the explanatory power of  the UCO and NCOM dummies in model B'. 
In sum,  the  results  from  Table 4  demonstrate  that  group level variables  are  indeed 
important for bankruptcy prediction. By incorporating these ratios, performance of prediction 
models improves significantly. The most marked improvement occurs when bankruptcy of  the 
subsidiary is imminent. 
15 (iii) Sub-Sample Prediction Models 
We now tum to the question whether or not the estimation of separate models for stand-alone 
firms  and  group  member companies  offers  further  improvement in  model performance.  In 
fact, the discussion in sections 1 and 2 has indicated that this issue may be important. Model 
variables are selected with the same stepwise estimation technique as used before. Models C 
and D in Table 5 are comparable to the benchmark models for t-1  and t-3  from Table 4,  but 
estimated solely on the sub-sample of stand-alone companies. Similarly, models E and Fare 
the benchmark models for the group member sub-sample. E'  and F'  are fully extended group 
member sub-sample models (i.e. the variable set encompasses all group level variables), again 
for t-1  and t-3 respectively. 
******************** 
Table 5 about here 
******************** 
Models  C  and  D  show  that  for  stand-alone  firms,  both  past  (PP)  and  current 
performance  (ROA)  matter,  and  this  for  one  year ahead  as  well  as  for  three  years  ahead 
bankruptcy prediction.  Leverage  is  not  included in  the  model.  As  mentioned  earlier,  past 
performance is  strongly negatively correlated with leverage, so that the optimization process 
is  constrained  to  select  maximally  one  of these  variables.  A  possible  reason  why  past 
performance  is  preferred  over  leverage  in  all  specifications  is  that  the  former  not  only 
incorporates  information on leverage,  but  also  reflects  the  firm's  past  ability  to  generate 
profits, and hence contains information on its reputation on that score. The fact that efficiency 
(EFF) is  not significant indicates that the mere generation of sales does not help the firm to 
survive; activity should also be profitable (ROA and PP are significant). Notice that, contrary 
to the full sample results, liquidity (LIQ) is a significant predictor of bankruptcy in the stand-
16 alone  sub-sample.  This  should  not  be  surpnsmg,  as  stand-alone  firms  cannot  rely  on an 
internal capital market to fill liquidity shortages. 
Looking first at one year before bankruptcy prediction for the group sample (models E 
and E'), we observe that, next to past (PP) and current performance (ROA), efficiency (EFF) 
does  matter  for  the  survival  of group  subsidiaries.  This  could mean that these  firms  are 
supported  by  their  group  as  long  as  they  are  capable  of generating  sufficient  sales.  As 
expected,  company  level  liquidity  is  not  included  in  the  optimized  models  for  the  group 
sample. At the group level, liquidity (GLIQ) is  important, as  well as  size (GSIZE), current 
performance (GROA), and leverage (GLEV). For t-3, the findings are similar, except that past 
performance loses its significance at the subsidiary level. This could indicate that the support 
of the  group  lowers  the  importance of the  subsidiary's  leverage  or profit generation track 
record. Contrary to the earlier results from the full sample estimations, liquidity at group level 
(GLIQ) remains in the model. Furthermore, current group performance (GROA) drops  out. 
This is in line with the findings from Table 4 that showed that group performance becomes 
especially important when bankruptcy of  the subsidiary is imminent. 
When comparing model performance across  sub-samples,  it  is  clear that predicting 
bankruptcy is  more difficult for  stand-alone firms  than for subsidiaries, at least once group 
effects for the latter are taken into account. Specifically, for stand-alone companies at t-l, p2 
amounts  to  0.627,  while  the  percentage  of correct  classifications  equals  84.8%  (quasi-
jackknife corrected). For group subsidiaries these values equal 0.766 and 90.1 % respectively, 
which reflects very high model performance. A  similar picture arises for the  medium term 
prediction models:  once group effects are accounted for,  bankruptcy is  easier to predict for 
subsidiaries than for stand-alone firms. If groups support their subsidiaries and only bankrupt 
them if the financial situation of the group itself is troublesome, this finding is not surprising. 
If such a strong degree of support is present, one would expect that group level variables add 
17 valuable  information.  This  is  confirmed  by  the  Vuong  tests:  the  group  adjusted  model 
specifications significantly outperform their non-adjusted benchmark models. 
As  a final  check on relative prediction performance for the full  sample,  p2  has been 
calculated for a combination of  the optimal stand-alone sample models and the optimal group 
sample models (models C and E'  for t-l and models D and F' for t-3). Table 6 shows that in 
this combined model p2  attains 70.1 % for the short term and 31.0% for the median prediction 
length. This compares favourably to the best performing models estimated on the full sample 
(an  extra  +4.2%  and  +3.6%  respectively).  As  mentioned  before,  the  most  important 
contribution to  fit at t-l is produced by incorporating group level predictors, while at t-3 the 
more basic adjustments (i.e. dummies) already perform relatively well. The total difference in 
fit between the basic prediction models - that ignore group effects - and the optimal separate 
sub-sample  approach  is  very  substantial  for  both  prediction  lengths  (+15.3%  for  t-l  and 
+ 10.9% for t-3). 
******************** 
Table 6 about here 
******************** 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Even though  academic  interest  in the  implications  of the  presence  of business  groups  m 
Continental Europe is  steadily growing, bankruptcy prediction modeling still largely ignores 
the  existence  of intra-group  relationships.  We  combine  insights  from  the  literature  on 
bankruptcy prediction,  internal  capital  markets  and  business  groups,  and  show  that these 
group  effects  affect the  informational content of accounting ratios  that  are widely used in 
18 bankruptcy prediction, such as  measures of liquidity, leverage, past and current performance, 
size and efficiency. The usefulness of approaches to correct for group membership previously 
applied in the literature, viz. the inclusion of a dummy for group membership and a measure 
of intra-group commitments, is confirmed. However, we show that including key ratios from 
the group or ultimate corporate owner increases model performance to a much larger extent. 
Size, current performance, leverage and liquidity of the group to  which a company belongs 
are shown to have a significant impact on the failure probability of the latter. Vuong relative 
content  of information  tests  confirm  that  models  containing  group  related  information 
significantly  outperform  unadjusted  benchmark  models.  Our  results  are  persistent  across 
samples and prediction lengths and are consistent with recent theoretical and empirical work 
on business groups and internal capital markets. 
We find that failure predictors differ across sub-samples containing only stand-alone 
or only group member companies. The data support the notion that, because of the presence 
of group ties, the path toward bankruptcy is different for a subsidiary as compared to a stand-
alone firm. 
Finally, our evidence indicates that especially financially sound groups support weak 
subsidiaries, so that the latter are capable of surviving distress for a longer time. In view of 
the concentrated ownership structure of Continental business groups, this behaviour may be 
less  driven  by  empire  building  or  other  managerial  agency  problems.  Rather,  the 
strengthening of intra-group relationships through the demand of guarantees by providers of 
external finance and the paramount importance of group reputation, may be more plausible as 
explanations. The motivation of business groups' behaviour toward distressed subsidiaries, as 
well  as  intra-group  and  extra-group dynamics for distressed versus non-distressed business 
groups, could be important areas for further research. 
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22 Table 1 
Sample Description 
Panel A - Failure Rates and Group Membership 
t-l  Stand-alone Companies 
Group Member Companies 
Full Sample 
t-3  Stand-alone Companies 
Group Member Companies 
Full Sample 
Panel B - Industry Composition 
1ndustry 
Food & Agriculture 
Manufacturing & Construction 
Distribution (Wholesale & Retail) 
Transportation 
Services 




















Failed  Failed in 
#  %  '00  '01  '02 
96  58.1  34  34  28 
57  40.4  15  17  25 
153  49  51  53 
96  54.5  34  35  27 
57  43.8  15  16  26 
153  49  51  53 
Failed  Non-Failed 
8  8 
81  53 
41  55 
9  14 
14  23 Variable 
Name 
Table 2 
Defmition of  Variables 
Definition 
Basic Prediction Ratios (Company Level) 






(current  assets - inventory  and  W,I.P,) 
current  liabilities 
(reserves + retained  earnings) /  (total  assets) 
(operating  profits (losses) ) /(  total assets) 
(ST debt + LT debt)/( total assets) 
sales/  (total  assets) 
Group Adjustment Dummies 
dummy variable: I if [Net Commitments to Affiliated 
NCOM  Companies] < -1/3 of  total assets; 
UCO 
o  otherwise 
dummy variable:  I if  an Ultimate Corporate Owner is 
identified; 0 otherwise 
Basic Prediction Ratios (UCO Level) 







(current  assets - inventory  and  W.I,P,)  of UCO 
current  liabilities  of UCO 
(reserves + retained  earnings)  of UCO 
total  assets  of UCO 
operating  profits (losses)  of UCO 
total  assets  of UCO 
ST  debt  of UCO + ST  debt  of DCO 
total  assets  of UCO 
sales  of UCO 






















COmmitmentscguarantees  &  loans) made  to  affiliated  companies  ) 
-commitments (guarantees  &  loans)made by affiliated companies 
§  Net Commitments to Affiliated Companies = -----------------
total  assets 
24 
E(Relationship) to 
Prob, of  Failure 
+ 
+ Table 3 
Summary Statistics and Univariate Tests 
1-1 
Full Sample  Stand-Alone Sample  Group Sample  Full Sample 
NF  F  NF  F  NF  F  NF  F 
SIZE  8.460  8.578  8.330  8.423  8.832  8.989  8.386  8.591 
(0.09)  (0.68)  (0.31)  (1.11) 
LIQ  1.028  0.637  1.079  0.629  1.001  0.669  0.997  0.735 
(7.57)***  (5.78)***  (4.35)***  (4.97)*** 
PP  0.110  -0.110  0.168  -0.089  0.089  -0.142  0.119  -0.009 
(11. 00)***  (8.75)***  (6.69)***  (7.16)*** 
ROA  0.047  -0.051  0.053  -0.064  0.040  -0.044  0.042  0.014 
(10.89)***  (8.28)***  (6.86)***  (4.87)*** 
LEV  0.659  0.846  0.644  0.853  0.697  0.841  0.696  0.789 
(7.73)***  (5.91)***  (4.80)***  (3.90)*** 
EFF  1.627  1.088  1.694  1.208  1.585  1.000  1.673  1.168 
(4.58)***  (2.59)***  (4.10)***  (3.87)*** 
GSIZE  12.125  11.170 
(3.62)*** 
GLIQ  0.858  0.504 
(4.45)*** 
GPP  0.245  0.017 
(5.69)*** 
GROA  0.054  0.003 
(5.52)*** 
GLEV  0.554  0.723 
(4.32)*** 






NF  F 
8.265  8.398 
(0.82) 
1.010  0.716 
(4.08)*** 
0.136  -0.001 
(5.62)*** 
0.047  0.Dl8 
(4.51)*** 
0.678  0.776 
(3.00)*** 
1.682  1.365 
(2.06)** 
Group Sample 
NF  F 
8.641  9.029 
(1.20) 
0.974  0.741 
(2.75)*** 
0.103  -0.017 
(4.54)*** 
0.019  0.005 
(2.40)** 
0.734  0.828 
(2.87)*** 
1.623  0.960 
(3.72)*** 
11.584  10.234 
(3.81)*** 
0.957  0.633 
(4.13)*** 
0.190  0.032 
(4.01)*** 
0.037  0.029 
(1.60) 
0.559  0.699 
(2.41)** 
0.740  0.732 
(1.66)* 
Test statistics in parentheses: Wilcoxon (Mann-Whitney) T-statistics for equality of medians; variables as defined in Table 2;  F = failed companies; NF = non-failed companies 
* denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; *** denotes significance at the 1  % level 
25 Table 4 
Basic and Group-Adjusted Prediction Models (Full Sample) 
t-l  t-3 
A  A'  A"  B  B'  B" 
PP  -6.119***  -6.602***  -7.644***  -2.954***  -3.672***  -3.039*** 
(31.442)  (33.929)  (26.902)  (18.405)  (5.354)  (17.714) 
ROA  -14.901***  -14.445***  -15.732***  -4.326***  -5.l38***  -4.643*** 
(29.614)  (26.935)  (22.828)  (6.954)  (8.988)  (7.021) 
EFFIA  -l.036***  -1.116***  -0.876***  -0.603***  -0.606***  -0.547** 
(12.442)  (13.080)  (7.021)  (8.035)  (7.790)  (5.897) 
NCOM  -2.771 ***  -1.723*** 
(7.381)  (11.690) 
UCO  -0.854**  -0.483* 
(5.677)  (3.186) 
GSIZE  -0.407***  -0.275*** 
(13.126)  (21.081) 
GROA  -18.980** 
(5.528) 
GLEV  7.489***  3.883*** 
(17.411)  (14.634) 
GLlQ  -l.l72* 
(3.029) 
Intercept  -0.047  0.493  0.492  0.189  0.617  0.519 
p2  0.548  0.567  0.659  0.201  0.257  0.274 
CPinsample  83.3  83.0  88.6  69.9  74.2  72.5 
CPt uasi-'ackknife  83.0  82.7  87.3  69.0  72.9  7l.6 
Vuong tests  z-statistic  z-statistic 
Model A' vs. Model A  2.997***  Model B' vs. Model B  6.199*** 
Model A"  vs. Model A  11.321***  Model B" vs. Model B  6.447*** 
Model A" vs. Model A'  10.547***  Model B" vs. Model B'  2.015** 
Notes: 
Stepwise logistic regressions (likelihood ratio optimizing); variables as defined in Table 2;  IA = industry adjusted ratio 
A & B = full sample basic prediction models; A' & B' = full sample group-adjusted models (allowing use of data at company level only) 
A" &  Boo = full sample group-adjusted prediction models (allowing use of variables at company and UCO levels) 
Wald test statistics in parentheses; CP = overall classification performance (in %) 
Vuong tests for log likelihood comparison of  non-nested logit models (positive z statistic implies the first model reflects more information 
relative to the second) 
* denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; *** denotes significance at the I % level 
26 Table 5 
Prediction Models for Stand-Alone and Group Samples 
Stand-Alone Sample  Group Sample 
t-1  t-3  t-1  t-3 
C  D  E  E'  F  F' 
PP  -9.004***  -3.488***  -5.323***  -6.977***  -2.246** 
(17.654)  (10.165)  (13.438)  (8.378)  (5.354) 
ROA  -19.965***  -5.448**  -10.749***  -12.686***  -5.605**  -8.495*** 
(17.225)  (5.192)  (8.820)  (6.783)  (5.266)  (9.069) 
EFFIA  -1.935***  -2.273***  -1.354***  -1.527*** 
(13.571)  (9.859)  (12.618)  (12.349) 
LlQ  -0.955*  -0.530* 
(2.928)  (3.296) 
GSIZE  -0.604***  -0.434*** 
(10.506)  (13.352) 
GROA  -15.642* 
(3.156) 
GLEV  6.844***  2.204* 
(10.137)  (3.436) 
GLlQ  -1.688**  -0.524** 
(4.199)  (4.514) 
Intercept  1.384  1.038  -0.686  3.203  -0.210  3.876 
p2  0.627  0.225  0.523  0.766  0.244  0.419 
CPin sample  86.7  68.2  84.9  92.2  76.2  76.9 
CP  quasi-'ackknife  84.8  66.5  83.0  90.1  73.8  74.6 
Vuong tests  z-statistic 
Model E' VS. Model E  11.118*** 
Model F' vs. Model F  7.015*** 
Notes: 
Stepwise logistic regressions (likelihood ratio optimizing); variables as defined in Table 2;  IA = industry adjusted ratio 
C & D = stand-alone sample basic prediction models; E & F = group sample basic prediction models 
E' & F' = group-adjusted prediction models (allowing use of  variables at company and UCO levels) 
Wald test statistics in parentheses; CP = overall classification performance (in %) 
Vuong tests for log likelihood comparison of non-nested logit models (positive z statistic implies the first model reflects more information 
relative to the second) 
* denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; *** denotes significance at the 1% level 
27 p2 _ Basic 
p2 _ Simple Adj. 
p2 _ Group Adj. 
p2 _ Basic + Group Adj. 
Notes: 
Table 6 
Model Performance Comparison 
1-1  Ll 
0.548 
0.567  +0.019 
0.659  +0.092 
0.701  +0.042 
+0.153 
Basic =  basic prediction model (full sample; Table 4 models A & B) 
1-3  Ll 
0.201 
0.257  +0.056 
0.274  +0.017 
0.3lO  +0.036 
+0.l09 
Simple Adj. =  group-adjusted model with adjustment for group effects using company level data only (Table 4 models A' &  B') 
Group Adj. =  group-adjusted prediction model model with adjustment for group effects using company level and UCO level data (full 
sample; Table 4 models A" & B") 
Basic + Group Adj. =  combination of  basic prediction model for the stand-alone sample (Table 5 models C &  D) and group-adjusted 
prediction model using company level and UCO level data for the group sample (Table 5 models E' & F') 
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